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UPDATING THE EXECUTIVE,
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PRESIDENT
Bernadette Meyler*
Jeffrey Crouch, The PresidentialPardonPower (U. Press Kan. 2009). Pp. 208. $34.95.
Clement Fatovic, Outside the Law: Emergency andExecutive Power (Johns Hopkins U.
Press 2009). Pp. 368. $55.00.
I.

ORIGINAL MEANING AND FOUNDING ERA POLITICAL THEORY

The profound interest in the executive branch that emerged following the Bush
administration's response to the events of September 11, 2001, has led to assessments of
the president's ability to take extraordinary actions during emergency, reexamination of
the scope of the "executive Power"I that Article II vests in the president, theories about
the "unitary" nature of the executive, and arguments about the parameters of the writ of
habeas corpus. While several of these accounts have relied on evaluation of the
Constitution's original meaning for insight into how to construe the relevant
constitutional provisions, others have insisted that the history of postconstitutional
executive branch practice should determine the extent of the president's constitutionally
authorized capacity.2 Both Clement Fatovic's Outside the Law: Emergency and
Executive Power3 and Jeffrey Crouch's The PresidentialPardon Power4 wrestle with
the quandary of how to reconcile the founding era history of their subjects with the
contemporary presidency.
Fatovic contends that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political theory
presented the elevated virtue and character of the king and, subsequently, the president,
as the primary source of a constraint on the abuse of his authority in situations of
* Professor of Law and English, Cornell University; Leah Kaplan visiting Professor in Human Rights,
Stanford Law School. I would like to thank Sandy Levinson and Mark Graber for convening an extremely
thought-provoking conference on executive power at which I received valuable comments on a draft of this
piece.
1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
2. Paul Halliday and G. Edward White provide a persuasive and historically rigorous version of an
original-meaning argument about the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution in Paul D. Halliday & G.
Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 Va.

L. Rev. 575 (2008). Christopher Yoo and Steven Calabresi contend, by contrast, in Steven G. Calabresi &
Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive: PresidentialPower from Washington to Bush (Yale U. Press

2008), that the scope of presidential power should be understood through examining consistent executivebranch practice.
3. Clement Fatovic, Outside the Law: Emergency and Executive Power (Johns Hopkins U. Press 2009).
4. Jeffrey Crouch, The PresidentialPardonPower (U. Press Kan. 2009).
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emergency., From his rich analysis of these materials, he concludes that we might
valuably revitalize virtue as a consideration in electing and evaluating modem
presidents. Jeffrey Crouch's book oscillates more between a reliance on founding era
rationales for the presidential pardoning power and an account of the costs and benefits
that today affect presidents' decisions to pardon in disparate contexts. The two works
nevertheless share a sense that it would be more productive for present purposes to
resuscitate the values underlying the Constitution than to turn to the original meaning of
constitutional text.
While this approach is provocative, it encounters certain obstacles when
implemented, obstacles that impede the effort to derive a persuasive normative thesis for
the present from past principles of executive power. The virtuosity and insightfulness of
Fatovic's analyses of Anglo-American political theory render such a quibble almost
irrelevant to the reader of Outside the Law, but it poses more of a challenge to Crouch's
thesis, which focuses heavily on the current implications of his account. Together the
books suggest that updating the theory of executive power may present a complicated
task, one that will require a nuanced dialogue between, on the one hand, normative
arguments that speak to the present situation and, on the other, the sometimes
surprisingly resonant and sometimes outdated rationales of the past.
II.

CHARACTER AND VIRTUE FROM BODIN TO BUSH

In Outside the Law, Fatovic addresses the problem of emergency power that has
plagued scholars of U.S. constitutional law for nearly the past decade by looking
historically to the roots of American attitudes within liberal theories of the state. Replete
with fascinating readings of liberal theory, from John Locke, to David Hume, to William
Blackstone, to the writings of members of the founding generation, the book largely
treats discussions of emergency internal to these thinkers' accounts. The conclusion,
however, turns to the contemporary moment and contends that analyses of these sources
may help to cabin what should be understood as an emergency in the first place. As
Fatovic contends:
From Locke's illustration of the burning house to Hamilton's reference to 'unexpected
invasions' and Jefferson's examples of a military siege and a "ship at sea in distress,"
emergencies of the kind that justify extralegal action tend to raise existential questions
beyond the ordinary competence of the law. [Tihe kinds of emergencies liberal
constitutionalists generally had in mind involved pressing matters of survival that require
immediate attention. 5
In service of restricting the number of situations that count as emergencies, Fatovic
contrasts them with crises, glossing the former as "extreme events that arise suddenly
and unexpectedly" and the latter as "chronic or ongoing problems," including, for
example, the financial downturn beginning in 2008.6 This vision of what constitutes an

5. Fatovic, supra n. 3, at 256 (footnote omitted) (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Speech in the New York
Ratifying Convention on the Distribution of Powers, June 27, 1788, in Alexander Hamilton: Writings 502, 505
(Joanne B. Freeman ed., Lib. of Am. 2001); Thomas Jefferson, Letter to John B. Colvin, September 20, 1810,
in Thomas Jefferson: Writings 1231, 1231 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Lib. of Am. 1984)).
6. Id
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emergency derives from Fatovic's readings of the liberal sources; by attempting to define
what an emergency is before the exercise of any prerogative to eliminate it, Fatovic's
account stands in opposition to antiliberal theorist Carl Schmitt's notion that "[s]overeign
is he who decides on the exception." 7 Whereas for Schmitt, the decision on the exception
also involves determining when an emergency has arisen, for Fatovic, the compass of
what falls under that rubric is more narrowly if not entirely precisely - delimited, and
this delimitation precedes any particular instance of application. In light of the oftenidentified tendency of emergency to become pervasive, this attempt to discern a
principled means of cabining the concept appears particularly significant.
Once a situation could legitimately be considered an emergency, Fatovic argues,
liberal theories of the state, far from simply endorsing an abstract rule of law or insisting
on the conformity of the executive's actions with legal principles, instead saw the need
for the exercise of executive prerogative - whether that of the king or of the president. As
Fatovic elegantly demonstrates, it was not liberal theory - despite its insistence on law that eschewed executive prerogative, but rather republican theory.8 The continuity
between liberal thought and older royalist perspectives on the prerogative remained, on
this account, greater than that between the liberal and republican reformers. Elaborating
on why liberals would have diverged from republicans in this respect, Fatovic explains
that "[s]ince early liberals understood that law and morality were analytically distinct
(albeit related), violating the law was not quite as problematic for them as it was for
republicans, who were much more likely to revere law as the foremost expression of the
ethical values of the community."9
Liberal theorists were willing to recognize that the laws might not cover every
instance in which power should be exercised and that particular circumstances might
require swift action most suited to the executive to undertake. They also viewed the
executive as the entity most capable of implementing the interests of the people and
considering the collective happiness of the polity rather than evaluating advantages
accruing to particular individuals. 10 The character and virtue of the executive, according
to Fatovic, more than particular structural controls placed upon the exercise of his power,
prevented him from disserving the public interest. Just as the liberal understanding of the
prerogative diverged from the republican, the two accounts of virtue also contrasted with
each other. Whereas republicans insisted on developing the civic virtue of all participants
in the political community, liberals were not convinced of the feasibility or even

7. Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty 5 (George Schwab

trans., U. Chi. Press 2006).
8. Hence, Fatovic concludes,
Locke differed dramatically from the republicans not only because he considered prerogative
indispensable and not inimical to the preservation of liberty but also because he accepted
exercises of individual political judgment and discretion in a way that they fundamentally rejected.
In some respects, Locke's theory of prerogative bears a closer resemblance to the arguments of
royalists than to those of republicans, with whom he shared many more political and ideological
aims.
Fatovic, supran. 3, at 59.
9. Id. at 36-37.
10. Id. at 75.
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desirability of this emphasis; instead, they focused on the virtue of the rulers. For these
liberal theorists, character and virtue represented personally based constraints on the
executive that would guarantee the appropriate exercise of prerogative and emergency
powers.
While Fatovic's account of the role of character and virtue within liberal political
theory is extremely convincing, some obstacles arise in attempting to reach conclusions
about contemporary constitutional quandaries from these early modem conceptions of
character. First, the role of character altered within the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries as England moved towards a legislative conception of sovereignty. Whereas, in
the early 1600s, the king's reputation had to be carefully managed to ensure his
continued authority, by the time of Blackstone, the law itself presumed the good
character of the monarch. Although the king's position might seem more secure under
the latter model, the presumption of his good character corresponded to a diminution in
his actual power. Addressing the American context requires the further attempt to
conceive executive character within a separation of powers framework.
Second, character itself constituted a peculiarly eighteenth-century preoccupation.
By the nineteenth century, at least according to one recent account,12 character no longer
furnished a focal point of attention. This change raises the question of how the emphases
of social and political theory at the time of the founding should be treated by present-day
constitutional interpreters, given their inevitably historically contingent quality. Finally,
a careful examination of the determinants of character within the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries reveals several aspects that might sit ill with the religious pluralism
of contemporary American society. To the extent that certain aspects of an earlier vision
of character no longer appear palatable criteria for contemporary political evaluation, the
issue of how one might sort the valuable from the dispensable aspects of character
becomes both pressing and vexed.
The shift from a king to an "executive branch" and away from monarchical
sovereignty inevitably affected how the character of the national leader was conceived.
The significance of these alterations is elided to some extent by Fatovic's reliance on the
notion that legislative authority was coextensive with sovereignty throughout the early
modem period. As Fatovic argues:
The initial confusion over the nature of the executive was largely a result of the Framers'
uncertainty over the proper location of sovereignty. Beginning with Jean Bodin and leading
through Thomas Hobbes to (moments in) William Blackstone, sovereignty was identified
so closely with the supremacy of legislative authority that it became difficult to reconcile
the idea of indivisible sovereignty with the emergent doctrine of the separation of powers.
The confusions in Blackstone's account of the British Constitution stem in large part from
Fatovic emphasizes this point in his discussion of Hume:
He developed a postrepublican conception of virtue that would appeal to leading nationalists in
America, who were becoming increasingly disenchanted with the prospects of republicanism during
the 1780s. Hume's insistence on the importance of the personal qualities of a ruler, especially in
times of national crisis, called into question some of the most cherished convictions of republicans,
who considered national character decisive in determining the outcome of war, for instance.
Hume's position on leadership was an oblique critique of the republican stance on civic virtue.
Id. at 104.
12. See infra nn. 24-26.
11.
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an analytical inability to disentangle the idea of sovereignty from the powers of the
legislature. 13
Although Bodin and Hobbes do emphasize the importance of legislative capacity
to determining sovereignty, the principal contribution of the former and, to a lesser
extent, the latter was theorizing the sovereignty of the king. For Bodin, legislative
power constituted the foremost mark of sovereignty, but he enumerates others, and much
of Bodin's advice pertains to the king's efforts to establish his authority and maintain his
reputation.14 Hobbes does insist strongly on the significance of legislative power, but he
associates this ultimately with the king, who also, as he discusses in the posthumous
15
Dialogue between a Philosopherand a Student of the Common Laws, must possess the
ultimate interpretive, or judicial, authority.16 With Blackstone, the effects of the
development of legislative supremacy become most clearly evident, and the American
context demonstrates a partial reaction against this dominance. 17 On the other side of
legislative supremacy in America, the executive finds himself in a rather different
position than he occupied before. This set of shifts helps to explain a rhetorical
transformation that is partly in evidence in Fatovic's book, but also appears more
dramatically from examining additional early modem sources.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, from Bodin, to King James I (who read
Bodin and other theorists), to his successors, the reputation of the king was an asset to be
managed, both by displays of justice and mercy and by resisting all kinds of slander or
scandalum magnatum. For example, as James wrote to his son Henry, in Basilicon
Doron, one of the most unpardonable crimes would be "the false and [u]nre[v]erent
writing or speaking of malicious men against your Parents and Predecessors"; James
instructs Henry, "sen ye are the lawful magistrate, suffer not both your Princes and your
Parents to be dishonoured by any; especially, sith the example also toucheth your

13. Id. at 180.
14. Legislative power does, indeed, furnish the first mark of sovereignty for Bodin, and at one point he
claims that "[a]ll the other attributes and rights of sovereignty are included in this power of making and
unmaking law, so that strictly speaking this is the unique attribute of sovereign power." Jean Bodin, Six Books
of the Commonwealth 44 (M.J. Tooley trans., Basil Blackwell 1955). Bodin nevertheless continues to identify a
number of other marks that we might not automatically view as comprehended within the capacity to legislate,
including "the making of war and peace," "the power to institute the great officers of state," "that the prince
should be the final resort of appeal from all other courts," "the right of pardoning convicted persons," "the right
of coinage," and "[t]he right of levying taxes and imposing dues." Id at 44, 45, 45, 46, 47, 47. For a longer
discussion of Bodin's treatment of the sovereign's reputation, see Bernadette Meyler, Theaters of Pardoning:
Tragicomedy and the Gunpowder Plot,25 Stud. L., Pol., & Socy. 37, 49-54 (2002).
15. Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue between a Philosopherand a Student of the Common Laws of England
(Joseph Cropsey ed., U. Chi. Press 1971) (originally published 1681).
16. Id at 70, 94-95.
17 For a discussion of the reaction against legislative supremacy by the mid-1780s in America, see
Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:FederalCourts and the Law 49, 51
(Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton U. Press 1998).
18. Scandalum magnatum constituted "[a]ctionable slander of powerful people; specif., defamatory
comments regarding persons of high rank, such as peers, judges, or state officials." Black's Law Dictionary
1345 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999). For extensive treatments of the dynamics and consequences of
slandering the sovereign in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, see generally Ina Habermann,
Staging Slander and Gender in Early Modern England (Ashgate Publg. Ltd. 2003); M. Lindsay Kaplan, The
Culture ofSlander in Early Modern England (Cambridge U. Press 1997).
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selfe." 19 The reputation of this "lawful magistrate" could be tarnished not only by insults
to his political persona but also by the casting of personal aspersions; James's own
comments were generally thought to be addressing the shame he had inherited from his
mother, Mary Stuart's, putative murder of his father. King Charles I would later savagely
punish the anti-theatrical writer William Prynne partly because of a perceived attack on
the participation of Charles's wife, Queen Henrietta Maria, in theatrical activities at
court.20 The scandals of private life might thus detrimentally affect the public persona of
the king.
By the time of Blackstone, however, the emphasis fell not on the king's own
efforts to maintain his reputation but rather on how the public should view the chief
executive in light of his institutional position. The passages that Fatovic cites from
Blackstone do not suggest that the latter necessarily believed the king in fact to be
someone of "greater perfection" than the ordinary man; whatever the actuality of the
matter, the king should simply be viewed as an individual of "greater perfection." 2 1
Hence, Blackstone writes that "the mass of men will be apt to grow insolent and
refractory, if taught to consider their prince as a man of no greater perfection than
themselves,"22 and that "the law deems so highly of his [the king's] wisdom and virtue,
as not even to presume it possible for him to do any thing inconsistent with his station
and dignity."23 Here, the law creates the character of the king, rather than the character
of the king determining the lawfulness of his actions. The significance of character
changes with the altered place of the executive within the system of the state as a whole;
whereas earlier, reputation had to be controlled in order to ensure the continuity of
sovereign power, with Blackstone, law itself dictates respect for the executive because of
his place within the system. Quite apart from transformations in the social meaning of
character, the conception and significance of the executive's character changes with the
gradual reorientation of the political landscape.
Alterations in the role of character outside the specifically political arena may also,
however, indicate the instability of its status inside that sphere. In Women, Crime, and
Character,24Nicola Lacey turns to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British novels to
investigate the rationale for changes in the English criminal justice system's treatment of
women. Lacey contends that, whereas in the eighteenth century, "attributions of
responsibility were based . . . on judgments about the quality of character displayed in

19, King James VI and I, Basilicon Doron, in Political Writings 1, 23 (Johann P. Sommerville ed.,
Cambridge U. Press 1994).
20. This gloss has a prominent history, including among its proponents Carl Schmitt in his work, Carl
Schmitt, Hamlet or Hecuba: The Intrusion of the Time Into the Play (Julia Reinhard Lupton ed., David Pan &

Jennifer Rust trans., Telos Press Publg. 2009). For insight into the interpretation of Prynne's 1633
Histriomastix, see Elizabeth Howe, The First English Actresses: Women and Drama, 1660-1700, at 21-22

(Cambridge U. Press 1992).
21. Fatovic, supra n. 3, at 124 (quoting William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A
Facsimile of the FirstEdition of 1765-1769, at vol. 1, 234 (U. Chi. Press 1979)).
22. Id (emphasis added) (quoting William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile
of the First Edition of 1765-1769, at vol. 1, 234 (U. Chi. Press 1979)).

23. Id at 128-129 (emphasis added) (quoting William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England:
A Facsimileof the FirstEdition of 1765-1769, at vol. IV, 33 (U. Chi. Press 1979)).
24. Nicola Lacey, Women, Crime, and Character: From Moll Flanders to Tess of the D'Urbervilles

(Oxford U. Press 2008).
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conduct,"25 by the end of the nineteenth century, the focus was placed not on character
and reputation but instead on "engaged volitional and cognitive capacity."26 If Lacey is
correct in positing that the importance of character diminished at least in the criminal
justice context during the course of the period she considers, we might suppose that
character correspondingly shrank in importance within the political theory of executive
power. The material that Fatovic explores largely ends with the founding period and does
not evaluate the effect that the nineteenth century's lesser reliance on character in general
might have on comprehending the role of character or virtue in policing executive
prerogative.
Finally, Fatovic's discussion of late seventeenth-century perceptions about the
king's abuse of his prerogative demonstrates the possible intertwining of considerations
of character and virtue with those of religion. As he writes:
Almost immediately after the Restoration, Charles II used his prerogative to grant an
indulgence to religious dissenters by suspending penal laws against those who refused to
adhere to the modes of worship prescribed in the Conventicle Act and other parliamentary
enactments. When Charles II invoked his prerogative to issue a Declaration of Indulgence
in 1672 without parliamentary approval, many of the king's eventual opponents . . .
interpreted this as part of a larger conspiracy to restore "popery" to England. These
politicians were aghast at the religious, social, and constitutional implications.
The outrage expressed in the seventeenth century against Charles II corresponds to
a particular religious vantage point; we might wonder today how much assumptions
about character and virtue in general partake of certain religious perspectives and how,
even if we wished to do so, we would be able to generate a vision of virtue that would be
acceptable to the various contemporary American religious and secular constituencies.
Not only changes in the place or conception of character may affect how the
political theory Fatovic reconstructs could be updated for present purposes, but also
shifts in the understanding of emergency. With the administrative state, emergency has
correspondingly become more dispersed, so that the Schmittian decisions of a singular
sovereign may matter less than the accumulation of determinations filling the gaps of
what Adrian Vermeule has called "grey holes."28 As Michel Foucault describes the
transformation in his seminar on Security, Territory, Population, the phase that follows
29
the disciplinary society he earlier outlined is that of "governmentality" and "security."
Within the system of governmentality which he posits arising in the later eighteenth
century in conjunction with a notion that commerce is free - the population rather than
the individual becomes the unit of analysis and disaster no longer strikes, but rather risks
including rates of mortality are calculated in advance. Part of the administrative
apparatus in place within the United States today is similarly designed to restrict the
25. Id. at 23.

26. Id. at 24.
27. Fatovic, supran. 3, at 44.
28. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian AdministrativeLaw, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1095 (2009).
29. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collage de France, 1977-1978

(Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., Palgrave Macmillan 2007).
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scope or effects of particular emergencies; one of the reasons we might agree with
Fatovic that the 2008 financial crisis under President George W. Bush was not an
emergency is that various administrative safety nets cushioned the blow of disaster for
the vast majority of the population. Likewise, the mechanisms of security that have been
in place for some time now are engineered to anticipate and prevent most instances of
emergency. The question of what role presidential character might play within such
dispersed systems of emergency response remains uncertain.
III.

PERSONAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PARDONING

In his provocative work on The Presidential Pardon Power, Jeffrey Crouch sets

out to address what he describes as "two pardon paradoxes,"30 the first consisting in the
fact that "this nearly limitless constitutional power has been used less and less over
time," 3 1 and the second in the circumstance that, "despite presidents' usual concern for
political safety, each of our last three chief executives has made at least one very
controversial clemency decision involving his political party's executive branch officials
or supporters." 3 2 These pardons were rendered suspect for several reasons: "First, few of
these clemency recipients had stood trial for their offenses . . .

Second, these presidents

waited until late in their presidencies, when they were safe from direct electoral penalty,
to grant politically risky pardons. Third and most important each president granted
clemency for self-interested reasons." 33 Attempting to resolve these paradoxes, Crouch
claims to use a "framers' intent"34 model, while he also surveys more recent
deployments of the pardon power, focusing his attention on President Gerald Ford's
pardon of President Richard Nixon following Watergate and subsequent presidents' most
notorious clemency decisions.
From examining these episodes, Crouch appears to conclude that the benefits of
engaging in pardons that were self-interested or last minute or both outweighed the
costs for President William Clinton and the two Presidents Bush (George H. and George
W.). Rather than recommending any institutional alterations in the system to remedy this
situation, Crouch suggests instead:
When a president abuses the clemency power, we need to decide that his actions will
trigger real sanctions. The judgment of history should be harshly critical of presidents who
make self-interested clemency decisions. It is only by punishing presidents who exploit the
clemency power that we can uphold the rule of law, and - ultimately - preserve and defend
our Constitution.35

Although he does not explicitly mention public assessment of character as a means
of checking presidential overreaching in the exercise of the pardon power, Crouch's

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Crouch, supran. 4, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Crouch, supran. 4, at 149.
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normative conclusion gestures towards something quite similar to what Fatovic is
recommending. As Fatovic indicates in his conclusion, today "[t]he right question [about
character] is not whether the president 'feels our pain,' as Bill Clinton intoned, or is a
'hard-hearted person,' as George W. Bush proposed, but whether the president places the
interests of the public above competing interests of self, family, sect, or party."36 if
evaluations of presidential character depend on the extent of the chief executive's ability
to avoid acting out of self-interest, such appraisals would censure the kinds of pardons
that Crouch critiques.
Like Fatovic, Crouch also concentrates his attention on the president, leading to
similar blind spots. Just as Fatovic's focus on the individual character of the executive
tends to neglect the administrative dimensions of contemporary emergencies, Crouch's
emphasis on relatively sensational presidential pardons underestimates the significance
of more routine exercises of the power. Crouch's narrative, however, unlike Fatovic's,
fails to remain faithful to the historical tradition he invokes. In the seventeenth- and early
eighteenth-century contexts, emergencies were arguably envisioned less as occurrences
for the state to manage than exceptions over which the executive should take control.
The history of pardoning, however, reveals a persistent duality between the regularized
grant of mercy - whether to reduce the penalty for a particular category of crimes or to
erase the memory of civil conflicts - and extraordinary acts of grace.
Crouch does discuss the administrative apparatus that arose around pardoning in
the United States during the nineteenth century, insisting that several of the presidents he
treats should have relied on the advice of the Office of the Pardon Attorney, but he does
not explain how to reconcile the rationales for pardoning at the time of the founding with
this newer development. As a result, The PresidentialPardonPower both disregards the
multiple varieties of pardoning present in England and early America and overvalues the
necessity of following an administrative vision of pardoning. By concentrating on visible
and problematic pardons in which the potential political repercussions of pardoning have
failed to deter presidents from acting, Crouch also understates the extent to which the
political pressures against pardoning in the present impede gubernatorial and presidential
exercises of pardoning in the crucial contexts of mitigating excessive punishment and
vindicating innocence.
As Crouch describes his method, he "examine[s] the historical and legal
background of the clemency power, with a particular focus on the framers' intent." 37 In
investigating the history of judicial interpretation of the pardon power, he uncovers two
justifications for its deployment an "act of grace" rationale, which he associates with
Chief Justice John Marshall's 1833 decision in United States v. Wilson,38 and a "public
welfare" or "public interest" reasoning, which he identifies with Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes' Biddle v. Perovich39 opinion. 40 Both of these bases also hearken back to the
founding era, under Crouch's account. The former corresponds with an earlier English

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Fatovic, supra n. 3, at 265.
Crouch, supra n. 4, at 4.
U.S. v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150, 160 (1833).
Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
Crouch, supran. 4, at 30-31.
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conception of the king's power to pardon; as Crouch quotes Kathleen Moore, "the
pardoning power [in England] . was analogous in theory and practice to divine grace.
Like grace . . . a royal pardon was thought of as a personal gift. Therefore, it required no
41
The latter accords with Alexander
justification and was not subject to criticism."
Hamilton's argument in Federalist 74 for granting the president the ability to pardon; as
Hamilton had claimed,
[T]he principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case to the Chief
Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments,
when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of
the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the legislature, or one of its
branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the
42
occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity.
Between these two justifications within political theory for the pardon power, the
history of those pardons that served to modify the institutional dynamics of the English
legal system is elided. Pardons historically functioned not only as acts of royal grace, but
also as means of modifying legal doctrine or altering methods of punishment. In the
medieval period, for example, pardons were routinely granted for what were considered
excusable forms of killing despite the fact that those acts were prosecuted as murders. 43
Likewise, during the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, conditional pardons
were widely used to promote the transportation of prisoners to the colonies in lieu of
imposition of the death penalty. 44 These forms of pardoning provide more compelling
precedents for the ordinary uses of the pardon power today than the justifications within
political theory upon which Crouch relies.
Crouch also minimizes the distinction between pardon and amnesty, a
differentiation that in various historical contexts led to amnesty's allocation to a
legislative, rather than executive, branch. According to his definition of the terms,
"Amnesty," which comes from the Greek amnestia, or "forgiveness," is typically granted
to a group rather than an individual, is often given pre-conviction, and usually rests on the
judgment that the public welfare is better served by ignoring a particular crime than by
punishing for it. Unlike a pardon, an amnesty does not excuse the crime; however, in the
45
eyes of the law, amnesty and pardon are treated about the same.

41, Id. at 11-12 (quoting Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardonfor Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. Rich. L.

Rev. 281, 282 (1992)).
42. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist74, in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, The Federalist
473, 475 (Benjamin F. Wright ed., Belknap Press 1961).
43. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Naomi D. Humard, The King's Pardonfor Homicide before
A.D. 1307 (Oxford U. Press 1969).
44. See Cynthia Herrup, Punishing Pardon: Some Thoughts on the Origins of Penal Transportation, in
Penal Practice and Culture, 1500-1900: Punishing the English 121 (Simon Devereaux & Paul Griffiths eds.,
Palgrave Macmillan 2004); Simon Devereaux, Imposing the Royal Pardon: Execution, Transportation, and
Convict Resistance in London, 1789, 25 L. & Hist. Rev. 101 (2007).

45. Crouch, supra n. 4, at 20 (footnote omitted).
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Amnesty is not, however, quite the same as forgiveness its derivation instead
connotes forgetting, or lack of memory. This origin is significant because amnesties - or
acts of oblivion, as they were designated in the English context attempt to prevent old
animosities from being recalled through additional punishment or prosecutions.
Amnesties may not excuse the crime but pardons do not necessarily either. Instead,
amnesties insist that the determination of guilt or innocence no longer remains relevant.
Partly because they are more general in scope than a normal pardon and partly because
they serve to reintegrate a divided polity, amnesties have often been granted
legislatively. Proposed by King Charles II, the 1660 Act of Oblivion following his
restoration to the English throne was ultimately passed by Parliament;46 by the time of
the Weimer Constitution of 1919, a distinction between pardon and amnesty was so clear
in the international arena that Article 49 of that document read as follows: "The
President exercises the right of pardon [das Begnadigungsrecht] for the Reich. Reich
amnesties [Reichsamnestien] require a Reich statute." 47 The significance of the
differentiation is important to understanding the debates about the proper location of the
amnesty power following the Civil War and the question of whether it should reside in
Congress or in Presidents Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson.48 Although Crouch
furnishes a fascinating and detailed account of the post-Civil War cases treating the
extent of executive, as opposed to legislative, clemency power, 49 the strength of the
argument that Congress - ultimately unsuccessfully - put forth in support of its claim for
control over amnesty is less evident than the broader history of the distinction between
amnesty and pardon renders it.
An administrative aspect of pardoning does appear in The Presidential Pardon
Power, introduced with the Office of the Pardon Attorney in the nineteenth century. On
several occasions, Crouch laments presidents' neglect of the Office's recommendations
or their failure to go through its bureaucratic process prior to pardoning. As he notes
about the end of Clinton's second term:
Observers were stunned by the number of pardons and commutations .... The pardon

attorney did not have the time or the means to adequately deal with [the] enormous
backlog: The office announced in October 2001 that new pardon applications could no
46. An Act of Free and General Pardon, Indemnity, and Oblivion 1660. For a discussion of this Act of
Oblivion, see Hobbes, supra n. 14, at 105. For insight into the legislative proceedings, see The History and
Proceedingsof the House of Commons: Vol. 1 - 1660-1680, at 2-25 (History of Parliament Trust 1742).

47. Weimar Const., art. 49 (1919). For a brief treatment of the relationship between pardoning and the
separation of powers in this context, see Carl Schmitt, ConstitutionalTheory 225 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans.,
Duke U. Press 2008).
48. For an excellent account of the disputes between Congress and the president over the capacity to grant
amnesty to members of the Confederacy, see generally Jonathan Truman Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty under
Lincoln and Johnson: The Restoration of the Confederates to Their Rights and Privileges, 1861-1898 (U.N.C.

Press 1953). The question of whether Congress could legislatively provide amnesty was subsequently debated
in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, when hearings were held on the subject of the appropriate treatment of
those who had refused to be drafted or had otherwise avoided or left military service without authorization. See
generally H.R. Subcomm. on Cts., Civ. Liberties, & Administration of Just. of the Comm. on Judi., HR. 263,
HR. 674, H.R. 2167, H.R. 3100, HR. 5195, H.R. 10979, HR. 10980, HR. 13001, H Con. Res. 144, and H.
Con. Res. 385 Relatingto Amnesty, 93d Cong. (Mar. 8, 11, 13, 1974).

49. Crouch, supra n. 4, at 28-52.
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longer be accepted and urged applicants to instead appeal to Clinton directly. 50
In summarizing the problems posed by certain pardons in recent administrations,
he further asserts, "In each of these cases, the presidents involved bypassed or ignored
the pardon attorney apparatus - thereby thumbing their noses at the public - and did what
they wanted to do." 5 1 It is not entirely clear from the book how to reconcile Crouch's
attempt to resuscitate the original rationales for pardoning with this emphasis on
following administrative procedures put in place in the nineteenth century. The longer
history of pardoning does, as discussed above, manifest forms that were more routine
than exceptional, but they coexisted with other kinds of pardoning. To insist too much on
the role of the Office of the Pardon Attorney would entail significantly altering the
strands of justification for the pardon power available at the founding and limiting their
variety.
Perhaps more troubling than a president's grant of pardon without Office of the
Pardon Attorney approval are chief executives' failures to furnish pardons even when
these are endorsed by the pardon bureaucracy. Recently, Governor Jan Brewer of
Arizona rejected the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency's recommendation of pardon
for a man who had already spent thirty-five years in prison and whom the Board had
concluded was innocent.52 One of Crouch's paradoxes invokes the diminution in
instances of pardoning, and he briefly surveys some factors deterring presidents from
pardoning ordinary individuals including "the fact that society has grown less tolerant
of criminals" 53 and "changes in the application process [that] have generally forced
pardon applicants to wait longer periods of time before they may apply for clemency." 54
He does not, however, emphasize that even when all bureaucratic requirements have
been fulfilled, the final decision makers may, and do, reject pardon applications for any
reason, or no reason at all.
These executive branch refusals to pardon may just as much as an improvident
grant of pardon - reflect self-interest. As Crouch himself observes, "[t]he current political
environment rewards . . . a president who is sparing with the pardon power." 5 5 The

character of a president as law-abiding is affected by the perception that he is willing to
grant too many pardons, and, hence, refraining from pardoning may serve the president's
own reputational aims. A thoroughgoing effort to hold the president to a standard of
character involving acting in the public interest would necessitate addressing the
instances in which he failed to pardon as well as those in which he seemed to pardon too
liberally.
50. Id at 112.
51. Id at 128.
52. Adam Liptak, Governor Rebuffs Clemency Board in Murder Case, 159 N.Y. Times A20 (June 15,
2010). As governor of Texas, George W. Bush similarly rejected the recommendation of the Texas Board of
Pardons and Paroles and refused to pardon a convicted rapist. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Gov. Bush Denies
Pardonin Rape Case, Despite DNA, 146 N.Y. Times 23 (Sept. 14, 1997).
53. Crouch, supra n. 4, at 62.
54. Id. at 63. For a trenchant critique of how administrative law has affected perceptions of the exercise of
mercy, including executive clemency, see Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the
Demise of Merv, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332 (2008).
55. Crouch, supra n. 4, at 5.
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It is instructive, however, to examine the most concrete example Crouch provides
of how to reconcile Biddle v. Perovich's concern for the public welfare or public interest
and Hamilton's defense in Federalist 74 of pardoning in times of conflict with a
relatively recent presidential exercise of the pardon power. According to Crouch, despite
the unpopularity of Ford's pardon of Nixon and the former's incapacity to provide a
persuasive justification for his action, this pardon did conform to "the framers'
understanding of the clemency power."56 As he writes:
A brief look at Alexander Hamilton's words from Federalist No. 74 . .. suggests that
despite Ford's mishandling of his public presentation of the Nixon pardon - the decision
itself was consistent with the original rationales offered for the presidential pardon power.
As Hamilton noted, "in seasons of insurrection or rebellion," the president has the power to
pardon to "restore the tranquility of the commonwealth." Watergate was a constitutional
crisis, and Ford was on solid historical, legal, and constitutional ground in granting the
pardon. 57
The comparison here between the insurrection or rebellion that Hamilton
envisioned and the status of Nixon's prosecution after he had left office seems somewhat
stretched. An effort to delimit what counts as an emergency along the lines that Fatovic
sketches would presumably exclude such an instance from its compass. The strained
quality of Crouch's attempt to fit Ford's pardon of Nixon within Hamilton's rationale
further calls into question the extent to which founding-era political theory can furnish a
useful benchmark for assessing pardoning in the present. Nevertheless, the invocation of
Federalist74 within the contemporary context suggests its potential relevance in another
setting - that of emergency powers.
IV.

PARDON AS EMERGENCY POWER

Juxtaposing Outside the Law with The PresidentialPardonPower not only reveals
a shared reliance on the original political theory behind the Constitution rather than on its
original meaning, but also highlights a significant omission in much of the recent
scholarship on executive power. Although pardoning, both as Article II presents it and as
it has been construed over the course of constitutional history, arguably constitutes the
most absolute of presidential powers, it has been invoked surprisingly little by those
debating the scope of executive power post-September 11. As a capacity for mercy rather
than a source of punishment, it might seem irrelevant to debates about extraordinary
rendition or the use of torture.
The longer, transnational history of pardoning, however, demonstrates its
involvement in situations akin to those in place today. Within late-seventeenth-century
England, prohibitions on certain kinds of pardons whether of the king's cronies who
had been impeached or of anyone who attempted to transport subjects to the colonies
without their consent - impeded the capacity of the king to immunize his allies acting in
56. Id. at 129.
57. Id. at 135 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 74, in Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison & John Jay, The FederalistPapers 415, 417 (Clinton Rossiter ed., Mentor 1999)).
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ways that might infringe subjects' rights.58 Under the U.S. Constitution, only the
restriction on pardoning in cases of impeachment remains today; 59 unlike in the earlier
English context, pardons could therefore be deployed to conceal executive officers'
illegal activities by being issued before the commencement of any prosecution. Pardon
and amnesty can also be used to avert rebellion or stop it in its tracks, as earlier
American examples and those from other countries demonstrate. 6 0 While it is possible
that pardoning would be an ineffectual answer to the threat of terrorism, the conceivable
employments of pardoning in such a context have not even been explored.
This division between the focus of post-September 11 work on executive power
and studies of the president's power to pardon recurs in Fatovic's and Crouch's books.
Crouch suggestively refers to and relies on Alexander Hamilton's endorsement of an
expansive presidential pardon, even in cases of treason, and his support, in Federalist 74,
for the use of pardon "in seasons of insurrection or rebellion." 6 1 Despite the overtones
that the language of Federalist 74 shares with the temporal rationales for expanding
presidential powers in cases of emergency, including during the War on Terror, Crouch
refrains from drawing the connection to the contemporary context. Likewise, although
Fatovic refers to pardoning on a few occasions in his own work, the power seems less
than central to his argument. It is, however, perhaps precisely in emergency situations
that the character of the president might convince us of the virtues of his pardons.
In sum, Fatovic's book furnishes an extremely rigorous and insightful account of
how liberal theory envisioned virtue and character as possible constraints on the
employment of emergency powers, although it largely leaves to others the task of
answering the question of how or whether such theory might be updated to fit the context
of the contemporary executive. Crouch also provides a number of compelling
observations about the exercise of the pardon power, but his normative suggestions about
its present employment remain difficult to reconcile with his account of the original
political theory behind pardoning, and this account itself appears rather partial in light of
pardoning's longer history. Nevertheless, for anyone who reads them, both Outside the
Law and The PresidentialPardon Power will produce fruitful insights on matters of

pressing concern.

58. Crouch helpfully discusses this English context, focusing on the controversy over Parliament's attempt
to impeach Thomas Osborne, King Charles Il's Lord High Treasurer, in 1678, an effort that was thwarted by
the intervention of the King's pardon. See id. at 12. During the same period, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679
provided an action for treble damages against anyone transporting a subject outside the realm without his or her
consent and specified that such a person would be stripped of his office, subject to forfeitures, and "be
incapable of any pardon from the King, his heirs or successors, of the said forfeitures, losses or disabilities or
any of them." Habeas Corpus Act 1679 (31 Car 2 c 2).
59. See Crouch, supra n. 4, at 12-19. See also U.S. Const. art. It, § 2, cl. 1.
60. Crouch treats this feature of pardoning, both as Alexander Hamilton anticipated its usefulness in the
Federalist Papersand as President George Washington employed it in responding to the Whiskey Rebellion.
See Crouch, supra n. 4, at 18-19, 55-56. For an example of a similar approach in a radically different context,
that of Imperial China, see Jonathan D. Spence, Asking for Forgiveness- At What Price? 150 N.Y. Times A23

(Mar. 27, 2001).
61. Hamilton, supra n. 41, at 475.
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